Abstract: My aim here is to contribute to the literature about Nietzsche's exemplars by excavating two undertreated but important themes in Nietzsche: first, his investment in the value of honor, which unifies many strands of thought in his ethics and his criticism of Christian morality, and second, his account of and investment in our capacity for empathy. I demonstrate Nietzsche's consistent preoccupation with honor, and give a specific account of what he means by it and why he is invested in it, offering some new additions to accounts of familiar Nietzschean themes along the way. I then describe Nietzsche's account of empathy and offer some remarks on its connection to honor in the case of the higher type. I conclude by setting out some implications the addition of these two concepts to our conception of Nietzsche's central concerns might have for philosophers.
Despite the abundance of Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship on many of the major themes in his corpus, direct and sustained focus on the "higher type" of human being, the production of whom many prominent commentators concur is the goal of his philosophy, remains uncommon. Scholars typically highlight only one or two features of this figure, and that often as part of a discussion of some other theme in the text. 1 In short, we have not yet developed a comprehensive portrait of the higher type, and several of the features Nietzsche associates with them have received insufficient attention. As a step toward filling this gap, this article excavates two undertreated, but important themes in Nietzsche's work that bear directly on his conception of the higher type: first, his investment in the value of honor, which unifies many strands of thought in his ethics and his criticism of Christian morality, and second, his account of and investment in our capacity for empathy. My aim in doing so is not only to add the valuing of honor and empathy to the list of features that define the higher type, but also to contribute to a more robust and integrated portrait of this figure by drawing out some connections between these two features.
First, I provide an introductory account of honor. Conceiving of honor as a status consisting of an entitlement to a certain kind of respect within a social hierarchy unifies both the ancient cultures Nietzsche explores and insights from contemporary social science and moral philosophy.2 Second, I argue that Nietzsche's corpus shows a consistent, lifelong preoccupation with honor and ancient cultures in which honor was valued. Taking seriously his historical interests, I consider Nietzsche's influence from past societies, focusing on his discussion of non-egalitarian orders and competitive rituals. I also confirm his commitment to honor in his unpublished and published works, and argue that he has a specific notion of honor animated by what he calls "reverence. " I close my section on honor by arguing that Nietzsche is interested in it for two reasons: first, honor codes facilitate the sublimation of psychological tendencies whose expression would otherwise be destructive, and second, reviving the value of honor is necessary to the development of Nietzsche's ideal of human excellence, as we can see from his remarks about the "order of rank. " Third, I introduce Nietzsche's account of empathy, distinguishing it from sympathy, the object of some of his most withering criticisms, highlighting some of its more important aspects, and arguing for its general importance as a feature of social life on his view. Fourth, I address what Nietzsche's interest in honor has to do with empathy, which plays an important role in his ethics in spite of his critical attitude to altruism, with a particular eye toward the relationship of the higher type to these two themes. In closing, I offer some remarks about the portrait of the higher type philosophers should engage with, and what this portrait can offer modern moral philosophy.
The Concept of Honor
Drawing on a broad consensus across not only moral philosophy, but also history, anthropology, and sociology, "honor" here is best understood as a status, attaching to persons, characterized by what Kwame Appiah has called "an entitlement to respect. "3 It is such an entitlement, and the conditions of its fulfillment, that Nietzsche would restore. Respect (and Respekt in German) are derived from the Latin respicere, which means "to look back at" or "to look again, " and even as we use the term now, respect refers to a kind of apprehension.4 As I will use it, respect is an attitude that a subject takes toward some object, wherein the subject responds to some feature of the object in a way that indicates acknowledgment of its value.
Honor operates as a mark of rank in a social hierarchy and is bestowed by judgments about the extent of one's proximity to the ideals of one's community. To exemplify those ideals is to embody excellence, not simply as a matter of having this or that attribute, but in a way that grounds one's general social worth; as William Ian Miller puts it, to assess honor is to "tak[e] the full measure" of someone.5 Honor guides how members of society comport themselves with regard to others; honor is the basis for being listened to, for others having second thoughts before causing you or those associated with you harm, and for what compensation is appropriate if any harm is suffered.
Honor has both external and internal components. The external facet of honor is public and second-personal. It is bestowed upon me by others in my community, and my value or rank is explicitly relational, being defined in contrast to others through the public interactions that make up social life. The two second-personal attitudes most often bound up with external honor are respect, on one hand, and contempt directed toward the dishonorable. The internal component of honor consists in how one assesses one's own status as well as others' judgments of one's status. The first-personal, self-directed feelings most closely bound up with the internal component of honor are pride and shame. 6 To violate an ideal in an honor society is dishonorable, and lowers one's status. In such a case, one is encouraged to restore one's honor, if possible, through some retributive act of equal value. Honor cultures often include forms of agonistic competition that regulate the distribution of respect even in cases not defined by some initial violation. Since honor is a limited commodity, honor cultures tend to incentivize behavior, often in the form of challenges to others, meant to strengthen one's reputation, whether verbal disputes or dueling. 7 As a value, honor is most often contrasted with dignity. Dignity is commonly defined as an inviolable and equal right to respect that each of us possesses.8 Unlike honor, dignity is not regarded as socially constituted. An act of contempt from another, for example, might lower one's social standing, but never one's dignity, which would remain untouched.
In his sympathetic notes on Eugen Dühring's 1865 book Der Wert des Lebens, a work that includes an explicit attempt to rehabilitate honor and its associated social feelings as important motives for moral action, Nietzsche himself dedicates several passages to the question "What is honor?"9 He concurs with our established definition, explaining that it can refer to a status one has that is "open to injury, " or as a verb, refer to acts of "distinguishing approval, " "recognition of special merits, " or "approval that our doing and being finds in others" (KSA 8:9 [1] , pp. 151-52).10 He offers similar definitions in his published works, for example, in HH 170, where he says that "to aspire to honor here means 'to make oneself superior and wish this superiority to be publicly acknowledged' . " Nietzsche also discusses dishonor, calling it "disapproval and contempt of our being and doing" (KSA 8 
Nietzsche on Honor
Nietzsche frames his historical-philological inquiry as a project with distinctively normative ambitions: "I do not know what meaning classical studies could have for our time if they were not untimely-that is to say, acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come" (HL P:60). He complains that modern Christian morality and its correlate in liberal democratic politics have "cheated us out of the fruits of ancient culture" (A 60).11 Honor is among the primary bounties of this lost harvest: "[What] then does Christianity negate? [. . .] that one sees to one's honor; that one seeks one's advantage; that one is proud" (A 38). And later in the same work: "Nowadays no one has courage any more for special rights, for the rights of dominion, for feelings of reverence [Ehrfurchts-Gefühl] before himself and his equals-for a pathos of distance" (A 43).12 "It is the powerful, " Nietzsche claims, "who understand how to honor" (BGE 260).
Nietzsche's interest leads him to make constant reference to past honor cultures, for example GM I:11's famous litany-"Roman, Arab, Germanic, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings"-evoked in a description of the "noble, powerful" types declared evil by the JudeoChristian "morality of ressentiment. " Nietzsche notes that the nobility in these cultures are characterized by rank-defining and rank-expressing rituals; they were kept "strictly within limits inter pares, by mores, worship, custom, gratitude, " though the lower ranked did not merit such behavior. 13 In GSt, Nietzsche points out that in contrast to "we moderns, " who believe in the "dignity of man, " the Greeks enforced distinctions of value between human beings by institutionalizing slavery (GSt, p. 3). Furthermore, he claims that we must accept a "cruel sounding truth, " that ranking persons is "of the essence of Culture" (GSt, p. 7). In HC, Nietzsche discusses a paradigm case of institutionalized honor: the athletic competitions of Homeric Greece. He argues that the outcomes of these institutionalized events defined the reputation, and so the welfare, of individuals and towns; honor was part of an ethos of "great personalit [ies] , " "enormously brilliant deed[s], " and the "fellow-citizens' judgment" that pervaded life: "the youth thought of the welfare of his native town when he vied with others in running, throwing or singing; it was her glory that he wanted to increase with his own; it was to his town's gods that he dedicated the wreaths which the umpires as a mark of honor set upon his head" (HC 58-60).14 Nietzsche also cites figures from honor cultures as exemplars of his own normative ideals. For example, in BGE 260, when he describes the "noble human being" of "master morality, " who "honors the powerful in himself, " he uses as an example a "proud Viking" from "an old Scandinavian saga. " In 1888, after hearing of the success of Georg Brandes's lectures on Nietzsche's philosophy in Copenhagen, Nietzsche himself wrote in a letter to his friend Peter Gast that his popularity in Denmark made sense, since the Icelandic Sagas were the "richest source material" for "my theory of master morality. "15
Respect as Reverence
What exactly is the respect to which honor entitles one? This question has not received enough attention in Anglophone moral philosophy, which tends, as Bernard Williams argues in Shame and Necessity, to take an impoverished view of ancient analogues of contemporary ethical concepts. 16 Stephen Darwall offers an instructive example of this phenomenon when he characterizes what he calls "honor respect, " the sort of respect at issue in honor codes, as an attitude of mere deference. He claims that the relationship of deference is analogous to a monarch's relation to his or her subjects: "One respects honor by deference. . . . The king's subjects defer to his wishes, and even if they may be imprisoned if they do not, this need not be thought of as their being held accountable for noncompliance. Deferring to the king's standing to issue orders is not the same thing as acknowledging any legitimate authority he might claim to do so. (In an order of honor, it's deference all the way down . . .). "17 Deference, as Darwall describes it, is a passive reaction to high status that demands only a yielding to the wishes or acts of the respected. This yielding requires no particular affective response to its object or belief in the value of its object beyond awareness of social custom and consequence. By contrast, and closer to the way respect was understood in historical honor cultures, Nietzsche conceives of honor as animated by what he calls reverence.
Nietzsche rarely uses the term "respect" (either Achtung or Respekt), though he often uses the term "honor" (Ehren) as a verb. But in several key places across BGE, especially the section titled "What Is Noble?, " he makes reference to what he calls "reverence [Ehrfurcht]" (BGE 260). Ehrfurcht itself contains Ehr, immediately tying it to honor-a literal rendering of the term might be "honor-fear. " The Ehr in Ehrfurcht and the term Ehre descend from the proto-Germanic aizō, which can be variously translated as fear, honor, or reverence. In other words, this family of concepts shares a long etymological and conceptual history.18 Nietzsche himself uses reverence synonymously with honor and respect in several places, confirming its importance for him. 19 To understand what reverence consists in, we can consult BGE 263, which is dedicated to the concept: "there is a reflex of silence, a hesitation of the eye, a cessation of all gestures that express how a soul feels the proximity of the most venerable. [. . .] Conversely, perhaps there is nothing about so-called educated people and believers in 'modern ideas' that is as nauseous as their lack of modesty and the comfortable insolence of their eyes and hands with which they touch, lick, and finger everything; and it is possible that even among the common people, among the less educated, especially among peasants, one finds today more relative nobility of taste and tactful reverence than among the newspaper-reading demimonde of the spirit, the educated. "
It is immediately clear that the attitude Nietzsche has in mind is not the sort to which we would apply the term "respect" in an everyday sense, but picks out a distinctive relation and an accompanying experience with which we are nonetheless familiar. At first glance, Nietzsche's description of how one falls silent, hesitates, ceases gestures when faced with persons or objects of high status might seem to conform to Darwall's portrait of deference, as does his praise, elsewhere in the same passage, of the sense that there are instances in which people "have to take off their shoes and keep away their unclean hands. " But by contrast with Darwall, in Nietzsche's description, the responses are not performed merely out of some socially acquired sense of proper role and ritual, or out of the fear of punishment. First, as Paul Woodruff puts it, "reverence is a matter of feeling, "20 and in Nietzsche's account, the immediate response to the object of reverence consists in internal states, of which the visible responses are expressions-Nietzsche describes it as a "holy experience, " which calls to mind a rich variety of affects. Furthermore, the experience clearly includes a positive appraisal of the object; the reverent subject must believe in the object's value. To further understand the mechanics of honor and reverence, we can examine them in the context of the persons Nietzsche takes to express them properly-his higher types.21
Nietzschean Exemplars
So far, our discussion of Nietzsche's investment in honor has been restricted to its formal elements. Despite the overlap in their formal structures, honor cultures of the kinds that influenced Nietzsche enshrined a diverse array of ideals-it does not seem, for example, that Homeric ideals and Viking ideals were the same. Brian Leiter helpfully argues that Nietzsche himself seems to accept more than one image of human excellence with respect to particular fields of interest or occupations, but he also thinks that some kinds of excellence, which he reserves for those he calls the "noble" or "higher type, " count as more valuable than others.22 Leiter catalogues a variety of features Nietzsche associates with higher types, but concludes that having all these qualities is not necessary to qualify as a higher type, since Nietzsche often describes them in isolation, and rarely mentions more than one or two together.23 In this section, I turn to a discussion of the higher type. My claim is that rather than any particular images of an ideal higher person, it is precisely the more general conceptions of honor and its value that Nietzsche draws from these cultures and makes distinctive of the higher type. As Nietzsche says, they "understan[d] how to honor" (BGE 260). I will argue that this influence consists in at least three features that are more central to the portrait of the higher type than many other preferences or characteristics: first, a capacity to recognize accurately differences in rank, second, the formal feature of self-reverence, or honoring oneself, and third, valuing honor in their interactions with their equals.24 Let us now fill in these claims.
Nietzsche thinks that to be properly reverent, one must have an instinct for rank, a capacity truly to apprehend differences between various qualities and the types of people who possess them: "There is an instinct for rank which, more than anything, is already a sign of a high rank [. . .]. The refinement, graciousness, and height of a soul is tested dangerously when something of the first rank passes by [. . .]. Anyone to whose task and practice it belongs to search out souls will employ this very art in many forms in order to determine the ultimate value of a soul and the unalterable, innate order of rank to which it belongs: he will test it for its instinct of reverence" (BGE 263). We need not commit Nietzsche to any particular stance about the metaphysical status of value to understand what is important here; it is enough to say that there are certain properties or features that Nietzsche and his ideal persons find valuable, and because they generally value honesty, higher types will not attribute those properties to themselves or to others if they are not present.
During his account of what constitutes a higher type, Leiter briefly mentions, though does not pursue in detail, a trait that seems particularly important for the higher type: "It is not actions that prove him-actions are always open to many interpretations, always unfathomable [. . .]. It is not the works, it is the faith that is decisive here, that determines the order of rank [. . .] some fundamental certainty that a noble soul has about itself [. . .]. The noble soul has reverence for itself" (BGE 287).25 To make sense of Nietzsche's claim, recall the affect and belief involved in the attitude of reverence. Higher types have a natural sense that they are valuable, and they respect this value by adopting the attitude of reverence toward themselves. This does not mean, of course, that they must be aware of their value and act accordingly at every moment-such a person is scarcely possible to imagine. Rather, the most charitable way to interpret Nietzsche is as saying that they are the sorts of agents who generally exhibit this distinctive sort of self-relation, which he plausibly takes to be far removed from the way in which most of us regard ourselves. As Leiter puts it, Nietzsche thinks "[s]elf-loathing, self-doubt, and self-laceration are the norm among human beings. "26 Building on Leiter's claim about self-reverence, we can add that the higher type also values honor in its interactions with others. We can turn again to BGE 263, where Nietzsche describes "a delight in the nuances of reverence that allow us to infer a noble origin and habits. " The higher type is the sort of person who actively enjoys the sort of rituals and behaviors associated with reverence not merely in their relationships with themselves. Two sections later, Nietzsche elaborates, claiming that the higher type "moves among these equals with their equal privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty and delicate reverence that characterize its relations with itself-in accordance with an innate heavenly mechanism understood by all stars. It is merely another aspect of its egoism, this refinement and self-limitation in its relations with its equals-every star is such an egoistit honors itself in them and in the rights it cedes to them; it does not doubt that the exchange of honors and rights is of the nature of all social relations and thus also belongs to the natural condition of things" (BGE 265).
The higher type "cedes" rights to its equals as "one more part of its egoism, " which suggests a complicated and active role for each individual. I take Nietzsche's remark about egoism to mean simply that higher types do not delegate rights out of a sense of inferior status or fear of consequences, but because they recognize in another the same sort of excellence they revere in themselves. Moreover, the higher type "does not doubt that the exchange of honors and rights is of the nature of all social relations and thus also belongs to the natural condition of things. " The source of the higher type's belief in the necessity of honoring others is a belief about the intrinsic value of the reciprocal exchanges between equals that is central to honor (BGE 265).
Having catalogued these features, it is worth stopping to consider the strength of my claims about how "central" they are to the portrait of the higher type. Investigating this issue in depth is beyond the scope of this article, and Nietzsche himself does not provide clear answers, but I will offer a few initial thoughts. Recall that he claims that self-reverence "determines the order of rank" in a "decisive" way (BGE 287). Though truly reverential attitudes can be misdirected, as he thinks Christians do with the Bible and objects of religious significance, the sustained self-reverence he has in mind is a distinctive attitude far removed from even the most intense vanity or arrogance displayed by regular people, and its requirements are such that only higher types can express it. We have seen Nietzsche proclaim that the instinct for rank is "more than anything else, a sign of a high rank [. . .]" (BGE 263). In the same passage, he seems to use "instinct for rank" and "instinct of reverence" synonymously-the person "whose task and practice" is to "search out souls" tests agents to see if they can recognize rank precisely by checking to see if they express reverence appropriately, and thus the "instinct" described seems to combine both accurate recognition of rank and the response to it into a single phenomenon. It seems, then, that Nietzsche thinks any higher type who values rank and can accurately recognize it will, when faced with an instance of it, either in their relationships to themselves or to others, generally respond in ways that count as reverential, and that these paradigmatic expressions of Nietzschean honor are sufficient markers of high rank.
Why Does Nietzsche Value Honor?
Honor is tied to at least three deep, closely linked psychological tendencies we have-a tendency to compare ourselves with others with an eye to our superiority, a tendency to strive for distinction or stand out from the masses, and a desire for praise-that Nietzsche thinks modern theories of dignity insist we extirpate or otherwise disincentivize.27 In GM II:8, he remarks that the relationship between creditor and debtor, the "most primitive relationship among persons there is, " coincides with "the first time [. . .] a person measured himself by another person, " and that "no degree of civilization however low has yet been discovered in which something of this relationship was not already noticeable. " He continues: "gauging values, thinking out equivalents, exchanging-this preoccupied man's very first thinking to such an extent that it is in a certain sense thinking itself. " In addition to this tendency to compare, Nietzsche also posits an instinct to strive for distinction: "[t]he striving for distinction is the striving for domination over the next man, though it be a very indirect domination and only felt or even dreamed. There is a long scale of degrees of this secretly desired domination, and a complete catalogue of them would be almost the same thing as a history of culture [. . .]" (D 113).28 But he does not think we simply want to stand out-our rank must be acknowledged by others. Nietzsche calls recognition, praise (and its opposite, contempt) "the greatest moral powers in common life [. . .] . The idea of the opinion that others entertain of us exercises the greatest power over our attitude" (KSA 8:9[1], p. 152). In perhaps his most forceful statement uniting all of the aforementioned psychological tendencies under the banner of honor, Nietzsche claims, " [o] ne uproots the essence of the human being when one makes the concept of honor suspicious to him" (KSA 8:9[1], p. 152).
Even if we devalue the instincts associated with honor, it is not immediately clear why doing so might be harmful. In addition to Nietzsche's general claim that suppressed other-directed instincts turn inward and can harm us instead if denied an external outlet, there are two reasons specific to honor and its relation to higher types, who are Nietzsche's main concern.29 First, Nietzsche takes at least some kind of "order of rank and differences in value between man and man, " as he puts it in BGE 257, to be necessary if we are to conceive of excellence at all. The "order of rank" is "just a formula for the supreme law of life itself, " is "necessary for the preservation of society, to make the higher and highest types possible, " and further, "unequal rights are the condition for any rights at all" (A 57). This is an argument about the conditions for excellence. If we accept that human excellence exists, we necessarily commit ourselves to the existence of the lower and mediocre, and to a kind of rank-ordering. Devaluing or denying our tendency to measure and make distinctions of quality risks making us lose sight of the very idea of excellence, without which higher types might never have ideals to strive toward, and so never actualize their potential.
Second, Nietzsche thinks striving for honor is conducive to excellence. In addition to sublimating our tendencies to "horrible savagery, hatred, and pleasure in destruction" in the expression of talent at, say, some athletic performance, as he describes it in HC, Nietzsche claims that the kind of rank-ordering judgments that define an ethos of honor are intimately bound up with the desire for excellence: "[w]ithout that pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between strata-when the ruling caste constantly looks afar and looks down upon subjects and instruments and just as constantly practices obedience and command, keeping down and keeping at a distance-that other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown up either-the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rarer, more remote, further-stretching, more comprehensive states-in brief, simply the enhancement of the type 'man' [. . .]" (BGE 257).
Before reconstructing the claims in this passage, it would be helpful to understand the "pathos of distance, " which features centrally in the argument. It is not immediately clear how a sustained hierarchy and exposure to differences in rank would generate a deep desire for enhancement.
Furthermore, what we have described so far is a set of social arrangements, which don't seem to capture the term "pathos [Pathos]" that Nietzsche reserves for the phenomenon in question. As in English, the German term is adopted from the Greek, and though it enjoys a variety of meanings, it still usually retains an association with inner states. Elsewhere, Nietzsche offers some clarity by defining the "pathos of nobility and distance" as the "lasting and dominant collective and basic feeling [Grundgefühl] of a higher ruling nature in relation to a lower ruling nature, to a 'below' [. . .]" (GM I:2). He means to pick out a certain experience, defined by a basic feeling of superiority that involves associated evaluative stances toward oneself and one's inferiors. 30 We can now continue to reconstruct Nietzsche's claim in BGE 257. Certain hierarchical social arrangements give rise, in certain individuals, to the pathos of distance, as we have defined it. Though the pathos "grows out of " these conditions, Nietzsche leaves unclear whether he thinks these arrangements are necessary or sufficient conditions for its development. The former claim seems too strong, since Nietzsche seems to believe some great individuals (Goethe and Beethoven) in his own time, in a social order he characterizes in starkly egalitarian, corrupt terms, have experienced the pathos. Moreover, there is no obstacle to imagining a higher type experiencing their distance from a lower nature in any particular social order-all that seems necessary is that higher and lower types encounter each other in sustained interaction. To claim that specific social conditions are sufficient to produce the pathos seems too strong as well, since that would attribute to Nietzsche a deterministic view about the relationship between social conditions and individual psychology that he rejects in the many explanations of human psychological and historical development across his corpus. The most charitable interpretation of his claim, then, is that the sorts of social arrangements in question are particularly facilitative of the pathos. The pathos of distance, in turn, is a necessary condition for the development of the desire for enhancement.31
The latter part of Nietzsche's argument depends on a causal relationship between the feeling of distance between higher-and lower-ranked individuals and the "longing for an ever new widening of distances inside the soul itself, " which Nietzsche does not specify. This relationship deserves more elaboration than I can provide here, and doing so would take us too far afield from my main concerns. What is important for our purposes is that the pathos of distance, without which the desire for enhancement "could not have grown, " is a fundamentally social phenomenon, and even if it doesn't require any particular social order to emerge, certain conditions are better suited for its cultivation than others. Honor systems, which are defined by clear, rank-ordering judgments, are just the sorts of social arrangements conducive to the emergence of the pathos of distance. Striving for honor, then, serves at least two important functions in this context: first, it helps give rise to the pathos of distance in individuals, by creating and maintaining differences in rank between them, and second, it helps maintain the general social or cultural arrangement that is conducive to the emergence of further excellent individuals.
An ethos of dignity or equal respect for persons, on Nietzsche's account, weakens the prospects for human enhancement, but not by removing our helpful instincts, since they are too powerful simply to disappear (D 48). Instead, the belief in dignity causes potential higher types to disvalue those instincts (GM P:6). Nascent higher types would grow to despise the very tendencies that would facilitate their own excellence, rather than cultivating them. One might think that there are moral theories that include a conception of dignity but acknowledge differences in particular talents between individuals, and do not condemn striving for certain forms of distinction. Nevertheless, Nietzsche seems to believe that any theory that regards people qua people as equal in moral value will restrict the outlets for these tendencies in ways that cause some agents-particularly higher types-to disvalue them to the extent that those agents ultimately do not actualize their potential.
Here, we should stop to note some complications. We have seen that Nietzsche thinks higher types value honor in its central sense as we initially defined it, in the form of status hierarchies consisting of entitlements to a distinctive form of respect. But historically, honor is a social value, and honor statuses are socially constituted. Striving for honor can thus include the desire for certain sorts of public praise, the third general psychological tendency mentioned above. Nietzsche often claims that higher types do not possess such a desire-their sense of value comes from within. Furthermore, there are traits that Nietzsche claims higher types often share, like a tendency to seek solitude, that seem to be at odds with a desire for public recognition and the social world of honor more generally (BGE 26). Indeed, he explicitly claims that higher types are characterized by "bravery without the desire for honor: a self-sufficiency which has superabundance, " where honor means the respect of the masses (GS 55).
We can not only resolve the tension between these claims, but also understand better that there is a role for the social dimension of honor even in the context of the higher type by drawing a distinction between nascent and fully developed higher types. Fully developed higher types are those who have an established sense of their worth, and tend to live accordingly, often seeking solitude to focus on their projects. It is the nascent higher types, bombarded by social pressures to disvalue the instincts and behaviors that would establish their sense of superiority, who would most benefit from cultivating a desire for public recognition of their distinction. Public praise aside, Nietzsche is aware of the benefits of certain kinds of social interaction for nascent higher types, especially with its inferiorsrecall that he explicitly holds that the pathos of distance is a sort of social achievement.
Furthermore, even developed higher types can have some use for public recognition. Due to a heightened general sensitivity that Nietzsche counts among their features, they might struggle to reconcile their existence with a society whose morality condemns their unique and most valuable features. Even they might sometimes lose their sense of their own value, and require the respect of others to sustain themselves until, in the best-case scenario, they recover their inner sense of their worth.32 We can find evidence that Nietzsche considered this process in BGE 269, where he describes higher types "often fighting against a long nausea, with a recurring specter of unbelief that chills and forces them to languish for gloria and to gobble their 'belief in themselves' from the hands of intoxicated flatterers. " The social dimension of honor, then, can play an important role for higher types, both nascent and developed. Turning to Nietzsche's account of empathy will help us deepen this point still further, in addition to fulfilling my general promise to discuss empathy in relation to the higher type.
Nietzsche and Empathy
Philosophers and social scientists use "empathy" to refer to a wide range of semi-distinct phenomena. One immediate distinction worth making is between empathy, the general capacity to represent to ourselves the mental states and processes of others, felt as if from their perspective, and sympathy, the altruistic concern for another sometimes produced by and including empathy.
Nietzsche makes this distinction in his work, through his general preference for Mitleid to refer to the suffering (Leid) caused by sympathy construed most often as concern that involves empathy with another's suffering; generally, he uses Mitgefühl and Mitempfindung to designate empathy. In HH 47, we find a clear statement of the distinction in a section titled "Hypochondria": "There are people who out of empathy [Mitgefühl] with and concern for another person become hypochondriacal; the species of sympathy [Mitleid] that arises in this case is nothing other than an illness. " Here, Nietzsche uses Mitgefühl to refer to a general capacity for empathy or fellow-feeling, free of particular connotations of value, while he refers to the pathological result, the compulsive sharing in and feeling for another's suffering, as Mitleid.33 It is clear, then, that Nietzsche wants to separate the question of how our general capacity for fellow-feeling operates from the question of its value. Nietzsche's polemics against Mitleid range from criticisms of its motivations to immanent critiques of its effectiveness, and are by now well-known.34 I will not concern myself with the critique of sympathy here, except where it provides relevant contrast with Nietzsche's normative views. Instead, I will focus on some of the connections Nietzsche draws between empathy and honor.
Nietzsche's most direct, sustained account of empathy can be found in D 142, a section by that very name (Mitempfindung):
To understand another person, that is, to imitate his feelings in ourselves, we do indeed often go back to the reason for his feeling thus or thus and ask for example: why is he troubled?-so as then for the same reason to become troubled ourselves; but it is much more usual to omit to do this and instead to produce the feeling in ourselves after the effects it exerts and displays on the other person by imitating with our own body the expression of his eyes, his voice, his walk, his bearing (or even their reflection in word, picture, music). Then a similar feeling arises in us in consequence of an ancient association between movement and sensation, which has been trained to move backward or forward in either direction. We have brought our skill in understanding the feelings of others to a high state of perfection and in the presence of another person we are always almost involuntarily practicing this skill: one should observe especially the play on the faces of women and how they quiver and glitter in continual imitation and reflection of what is felt to be going on around them. . . . If we ask how we became so fluent in the imitation of the feelings of others the answer admits of no doubt: man, as the most timid of all creatures on account of his subtle and fragile nature, has in his timidity the instructor in that empathy, that quick understanding of the feelings of another (and of animals). Through long millennia he saw in everything strange and lively a danger: at the sight of it he at once imitated the expression of the features and the bearing and drew his conclusion as to the kind of evil intention behind these features and this bearing.
Nietzsche lays out here an account of empathy that includes both its developmental history and at least some of its physiological and psychological components.
At least four features of this account merit mention. First, Nietzsche thinks humans began to exercise this capacity for empathy to preempt and understand danger from other humans and animals, and that the human capacity for empathy still has much to do with our sheer vulnerability to harm. He does not believe that empathy is now primarily a matter of gauging dangerin the same passage, he associates it with the development of religious belief, the ability to appreciate art, and other forms of pleasure. Second, empathy is largely refined by training; our inborn facility is augmented through repeated use in various social situations. Third, Nietzsche sees at least two approaches to representing another's feelings. One is a matter of inferring the causes of another's display of feeling, then simulating the circumstances involving those causes in order to produce those feelings in ourselves. The other is a matter of imitating the physical manifestation of that display, which will more directly trigger inner states correlated with those physical motions in our particular cultural context. Fourth, Nietzsche observes that the exercise of empathy is sometimes more conscious, as when one strives to infer what another is feeling, and at other times more automatic, conforming to what psychologists now refer to as "mirroring. " Taken as a whole, Nietzsche's account is a prescient, early formulation of what philosophers and psychologists call Simulation Theory, the view that human mentalizers primarily, but not exclusively, "employ imagination, mental pretense, or perspective taking ('putting oneself in the other person's shoes') to determine others' mental states. "35 That we are skilled simulators will be important for understanding the connections between honor and empathy, but the "almost involuntary" form of empathy that Nietzsche construes as a persistent background feature of our social lives will be particularly important for what follows.
Honor, Empathy, and the Higher Type
Now that we have established some of the basics of Nietzsche's account of empathy, I will point here to only a few of the more significant connections between the higher type's empathic capacities and honor. Recall that Nietzsche thinks comparing oneself with others, striving for distinction, and the desire for public recognition of that distinction are psychological tendencies associated with honor. Nietzsche explicitly describes empathy as necessary for the gratification of the latter two drives. In reference to the drive for comparison, he claims: "the empathy which this drive requires for its gratification is far from being harmless or sympathetic or kind. We want, rather, to perceive or divine how the next man outwardly or inwardly suffers from us, how he loses control over himself and surrenders to the impressions our hand or even merely the sight of us makes upon him; and even when he who strives after distinction makes and wants to make a joyful, elevating or cheering impression, he nonetheless enjoys this success not inasmuch as he has given joy to the next man or elevated or cheered him, but inasmuch as he has impressed himself on the soul of the other, changed its shape and ruled over it at his own sweet will" (D 113).
The desire for rank requires not only that others exist so that comparisons might be made, but that one can feel the effects of one's acts upon them. Higher types experience their rank in part through its expression in the success of their acts, insofar as they pick up on the impressions their efforts have on others. Empathy is an important part of this process. Empathy thus helps fuel those who strive for distinction by satisfying those drives that can be channeled into honor practices.
As we have noted, Nietzsche also thinks people want explicit, public recognition of their distinction including nascent and sometimes even developed higher types, and furthermore, that this public recognition can help higher types establish or maintain their own inner sense of their worth (BGE 269). Here, too, empathy plays an important role, as Nietzsche claims that people often have a "need for sympathetic affection" as part of the desire for "objective recognition" (KSA 8:9[1], p. 152). In cases where higher types benefit from public recognition, this recognition would not take the form of distant approval or formal acceptance of their value. Since higher types value true assessments of worth, and are generally averse to self-deception, it seems clear that they would want others to feel with them and to agree that they warrant merit, to the extent possible. Furthermore, this sort of public praise also seems like the most plausible candidate for the sort of establishment or restoration of higher types' sense of their value. Not only do such appraisals conform more to the desires of the higher types, making them more likely that higher types would accept them, but since these judgments are likely to be more accurate, since they are formed by empathic contact, it is more probable that they will help establish or reestablish higher types' true sense of their worth.
Empathy also figures in Nietzsche's explanation of responses to acts of honor or dishonor. In WS 33, Nietzsche describes the psychological possibilities in various scenarios wherein one party is injured by another, and claims that the injured party, from "the standpoint of wounded honor, " feels compelled to perform retributive acts to restore their status. Nietzsche makes clear the public nature of this harm, and claims that empathy is integral to how the injured feels the contempt of their assailant and any spectators: "[h]is revenge will be the more incensed or the more moderate according to how deeply or weakly he can enter into the soul of the perpetrator and the witnesses of his injury; if he is wholly lacking in this kind of imagination, he will not think of revenge at all, as the feeling of 'honor' is not present in him, and thus cannot be wounded" (WS 33). Nietzsche connects the ability to enter into the "souls" of others to the very "feeling of honor" in the first place, arguing that the former is necessary for the latter. Even if one values reciprocity in the distribution of both rights and harms, as honor cultures encourage and as higher types do, without the ability to take on the perspective of others, one cannot feel the full weight of either the pleasure of one's assailants or the judgments of shame they and any other spectators dispense, and as such, one does not feel wounded or "dishonored. " I see no reason why, on Nietzsche's view, feeling the full force of judgments of respect would not operate similarly. As we have established higher types are paradigmatically honorable, it is plausible that they possess this feeling of honor more keenly than others, and so must also, on Nietzsche's picture, possess a particularly refined empathic sensitivity to others, even if they do not always feel the impacts of others' judgments, particularly lower types, the way lower types themselves experience them.36 As Nietzsche explicitly claims in GM I:10, even higher types are susceptible to vengefulness.
And consistent with their investment in honorable reciprocity, he further proclaims that they have a "capacity for, and the duty of " revenge with respect to their equals (BGE 260). Their power enables them to act immediately and decisively, and so to discharge this feeling quickly, unlike lower types, but it is deeply important for Nietzsche that they can and should be vengeful all the same. If being appropriately reciprocal is fundamentally honorable, and requires empathy, then empathy is central to not just understanding, but also to responding honorably.
Empathy is also at the heart of the higher type's ability to honor in another context: Nietzsche takes it to be critical to the process by which one higher type comes to revere another. Recall his description of how the higher type "moves among these equals with their equal privileges, showing the same sureness of modesty and delicate reverence that characterize its relations with itself [. . .]. It is merely another aspect of its egoism, this refinement and self-limitation in its relations with its equals [. . .] it honors itself in them and in the rights it cedes to them [. . .]" (BGE 265). In the same passage, Nietzsche notes that the higher type is resistant to the idea that it has equals, but all the same, "it admits [. . .] under circumstances that give it pause [. . .] that there are others with equal rights to its own. " How exactly does it get clear about this question of rank? First, in order to recognize an equal, Nietzsche's exemplars must first be aware of their own rank, which is their only yardstick for judging the rank of equals; this is part of why Nietzsche emphasizes that "an instinct for rank [. . .] is a sign of a high rank" (BGE 263). BGE 287 establishes that "actions" and "works"-in other words, external signs-are insufficient to mark a person as a higher type on Nietzsche's view. The only reliable or "decisive" indicators of someone's rank are internal: the two criteria we identified were the higher type's self-reverence and its instinct for rank. How does one higher type detect another's self-reverence? Though Nietzsche does not mention it by name, I submit that this process must be empathic; there is no other capacity we have that would allow us to understand the inner life of another. We can find some support for this view by returning to Nietzsche's description of how the soul "feels the proximity of the most venerable, " and again, how the test of an instinct for rank is a test of the "soul" (BGE 263).
One might worry that describing the process of identifying another's self-reverence as empathic in any robust sense is too hasty. After all, Nietzsche claims only that actions and works are insufficient to establish rank. Since no one has direct access to another's inner states, external signs must still be involved. Nietzsche himself makes this clear in his description of the test of the instinct for reverence, which consists of observing someone's reaction to high rank. This being the case, why couldn't the process of discerning rank involve a mere rational inference from actions and works to the conclusion that they are self-reverent? One difficulty with this alternative account is how the higher type would justify the conclusion that it had found an equal in rank. There are no decisively noble actions or works, or even formal categories of noble actions or works that might serve as a guide, and so comparing the actions of another to one's own actions cannot secure certainty about another's rank. Thus, even if the investigators had a strong sense of their own value, they would have little grounds for assuming that any particular acts or responses, especially those that differ from those they generally perform, were a premise from which they could infer the target's self-reverence. The investigators must then have to compare not actions, but to try to compare their own sense of reverence to the feelings of the other. Comparing feelings in this way would most plausibly involve precisely the sort of robust simulational process Nietzsche himself outlines in D 142. There is a place for inferences on this view, and perhaps one higher type will make several of them in the course of establishing another's rank, but only within the context of a broader perspective-taking in which they try to inhabit the perspective of the other as a way to divine their nature.37
Though far from exhaustive, my investigation of the higher type's relationship to empathy allows us to make a further claim. If exercising empathy is conducive to the development of honor in a number of deeply important ways, and an investment in honor saturates the life of the higher type, then on Nietzsche's account, it would be implausible to conceive of higher types who aren't skilled empathizers whose capacities are refined by their elevation in rank. It is difficult to see how some individuals who lacked the kind of sensitivity to the world required to accurately discern others' rank, or to feel the full force of their actions, would be able to develop themselves into or live as the sorts of exemplars Nietzsche describes. Here, too, work far beyond the scope of this article is required to make sense of Nietzsche's comprehensive view of empathy and its relationship to the higher type. Still, we have collected enough evidence to suggest that developed empathic capacities should be regarded as characteristic of higher type as a type, rather than incidental features higher types might tend to possess.
One final, immediate consequence worth drawing from my preceding claims about empathy's importance for Nietzsche is that when he criticizes empathy and praises its regulation, it is not because he finds empathy unimportant or thinks it is negative in general (though he clearly thinks the exercise of empathy is often harmful). Instead Nietzsche praises the regulation of empathy in part because empathy is important to the existence of the kinds of persons he thinks matter most, and so too important to lose through overuse and exhaustion. Those who cannot regulate their general sensitivity to others' judgments will, on his view, renounce the "playground of honor" (KSA 8:9[1], p. 153). In doing so, he claims, they will "become a hermit" and "constrain their sympathetic affections to the smallest measure. " In other words, while honor and other components of social life might be generally conducive to the production and refinement of empathy, a person who, from exhaustion, injury, or fear, gives up the social world of honor will end up giving up empathy and all its benefits, and perhaps risking the person's self-actualization in the process.38
Concluding Remarks
The portrait of Nietzsche's higher types to which I have contributed here includes a deep investment in an ethos of honor, including to concepts like reverence and reciprocity, and a keen and active capacity for empathy that saturates their lives. Furthermore, the elements of honor and the exercise of empathy are closely tied, and each helps fuel the other. I have tried to go beyond merely cataloguing features that we might add to a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a higher type by also highlighting some of the ways in which these features are bound up with one another, in the hopes of making the concept of the higher type more robust and drawing out the subtlety and complexity of the figure that Nietzsche no doubt intended to capture.
Finally, I want to raise the question of what Nietzsche, as I have portrayed him here, has to offer moral philosophy, and offer a few suggestions in response. Thinkers like Hume and Smith, among others, are often praised for their nuanced and wide-ranging remarks on our empathic capacities. While I have begun to investigate Nietzsche's views on empathy, this area of his thought remains undertreated, and merits further investigation for insights it can yield into this still-opaque phenomenon. Nietzsche's work on honor also has significant contributions to make in the recent debate not only about honor itself, but also about the much more common philosophical theme of dignity and equal respect. And finally, for moral philosophers invested in the ideas that Nietzsche criticizes, it is best to confront him at his most subtle and formidable, which requires still more close reading. I hope to have at least gestured in the direction of each of these projects. 24. Nietzsche does think that these formal features will determine, to some extent, more particular traits of the person. For example, in the description of his stratified hierarchy of types in A 57, he claims that "crafts, trade, farming, science, most of art, in a word, employment, can only really function on the basis of a mediocrity of ability and desire; this sort of thing would be out of place among exceptional people. " More work is required to elaborate the relationship between the formal features of honor and the higher type's rejection of particular aspirations.
25. Here, we find one major point of departure from honor as understood in historical honor cultures. Nietzsche does not seem to think that the higher type's sense of its own value is socially constituted. There may be, independently, a socially constituted sense of its value, but its self-respect comes, first and foremost, from within. I will elaborate on this later.
26. Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 97. 27. See the short discussion in TI "Skirmishes" 48 about how the "doctrine of equality" "make[s] the unequal equal. " I will elaborate on this point later in this section.
28. Importantly, this distinction isn't specifically socially constituted. What Nietzsche has in mind here is an actual exercise of power, hence the talk of domination. Nietzsche's interest in our instinct to dominate others or strive for distinction is not an endorsement of any and all particular forms this striving might take. There are individuals with no potential for the kinds of excellence he values whose drive for distinction might lead them to perform all sorts of disagreeable acts.
29. See A 6; GM II:18. 30. Nietzsche notes multiple times in GM I:2 that this basic feeling is "the origin" of "an outpouring of highest rank-ordering, rank-distinguishing value judgments, " so while the feeling itself seems to contain an evaluative component, it does not itself involve the kinds of judgments Nietzsche associates with a full-fledged noble ethos or system of ethics.
31. The pathos of distance certainly does not seem to be a sufficient condition for the desire for enhancement. We can certainly imagine individuals who are ranked highly in a social hierarchy who are content with their superiority and do not further seek excellence in Nietzsche's sense. Furthermore, we can imagine desiring various sorts of self-improvement without anything like the pathos of distance, but the desire at issue here is a distinctive psychological phenomenon, consisting of a deep longing for "ever higher" states.
32 [I]t is helpful to distinguish two types of mind reading and two associated types of simulation processes. There seems to be a fairly simple or "primitive" way of assigning mental states to others that involves comparatively little computation or inference. Among other things, mental states "read" in this fashion do not have associated propositional contents, which inevitably introduce greater complexity. We refer to this ostensibly "simple" mode of mind reading as "low-level" mind reading. It is to be contrasted with a more complex mode of mind reading, which we refer to as "high-level" mind reading. (527) As it turns out, the imitation of facial features Nietzsche describes is a paradigmatic example of low-level simulation. As for high-level simulation, it is "more complex and tends to involve propositional attitudes [. . .] . This kind of simulation process also involves the use of imagination. Imagination is here understood as a constructive process that attempts to produce a prespecified mental state in the self by endogenous means [. . .]. If you seek to predict someone's decision-for example, the choice of a main dish by your dinner companion at a restaurant-how could you use imagination to make this prediction? The first step is to put yourself in your target's shoes, or take her 'perspective. ' Taking someone's perspective here means adopting, as far as feasible and in light of what you know about her, the mental states she starts with. This includes her preferences about food in general, what she liked at this restaurant on previous occasions, how hungry she is on the present occasion (did she have a light lunch, no lunch, or a heavy lunch today?), and so forth. Using the imagination, you can simulate being in her various dinner-relevant states" (531).
36. Higher types are often defined by their lack of care for the lower types, and so it is not plausible that higher types would always be affected by the judgments of lower types, whether respect (but for the occasional circumstances we have already outlined), scorn, or contempt.
37. This sort of perspective-taking, or high-level simulation, is also at work elsewhere in his oeuvre, for example, in his famous GM III:12 passage on "perspectivism. "
38. Discussing all the uses of empathy in Nietzsche is outside the scope of this article, but there is good evidence for thinking that it is conducive to the production of higher types even apart from the context of honor.
